
Participants in Study 1 either engaged in a negotiation with a "phantom" second negotiator or observed the negotiation. Negotiators judged whether the observer would be able to accurately discern their goals from their behavior; observers judged the negotiator's goals. Results indicated that negotiators overestimated the transparency of their objectives. An interaction between goal salience and constraints on communication was also evident: When communication was highly constrained, negotiators overestimated their transparency only when they were led to focus on their goals; when communication was less constrained, negotiators overestimated their transparency regardless of goal salience. Study 2 revealed that motivational forces are not necessary for transparency overestimation to occur: Observers informed about a negotiator's goals also overestimated the extent to which his or her goals would be transparent to an uninformed observer.


Negotiation is typically necessary when people or groups who are interdependent find that they have a conflict of interest and there are no established rules for deciding what to do (Lewicki & Litterer, 1985; Thompson, 1990). The conflict may center on competition for scarce resources such as money and information or on a difference of opinion that must be resolved so that action can be taken (Aubert, 1962). Social concerns often figure prominently in the negotiation process, as is illustrated by how people sometimes become so preoccupied with "saving face" or with thwarting their opponent that they act against their own interest to achieve these more interpersonal objectives (Brown, 1968). In other cases, a desire to preserve positive relations with the other person can take precedence over securing optimal outcomes for oneself (Brandstatter, Kette, & Sageder, 1982; Lewicki & Litterer, 1985; Schuler, 1982). Thus, feelings about the other party as well as concerns with impression management (see also Pruitt & Smith, 1981; Rosenfeld, Giacalone, & Riordan, 1995) are often important to the process of trying to reach agreements about how to divide resources and solve problems.

The present research explores the accuracy of interpersonal judgments in the context of negotiation. We examine negotiators' appreciation of the goals and motives that their actions communicate to their fellow negotiators. Our main hypothesis is that negotiators tend to overestimate their "transparency," presuming that their objectives are more readily apparent to others than is in fact the case. We expect that negotiators frequently believe that another party will be able to accurately deduce their objectives (e.g., to be cooperative or assertive or to ensure a similar degree of compromise by all), when in fact he or she is uncertain about their goals or forms impressions that are different from negotiators' own self-perceptions.
Consider the process by which such transparency overestimation might occur. A woman who has the goal of being assertive may reflect on the meaning of her decisions and remarks during a dispute with a colleague. There may be moments when she perceives an opportunity to offer compromises or inject humor into the situation but refrains from doing so to maintain her assertive stance; these instances of "standing firm" may be focal in her own mind. She may also consider her past actions and personality traits: Knowledge of her generally aggressive interpersonal style may enhance her sense of the boldness of her present behavior. In sum, the woman's access to her current goals, thoughts, and feelings might influence how she perceives her own actions, leading her to see her behaviors as consistent with self-relevant information (Markus & Sentis, 1982). Transparency overestimation is apt to occur if the woman assumes that her colleague will share her interpretations, and thus fails to appreciate how her private self-knowledge—which is inaccessible to him—has guided her self-perceptions. In fact, he might be quite puzzled about her objectives or draw conclusions that are different from those she anticipates.

People's sense of the degree to which their own objectives are readily apparent to another party should have ramifications for their decisions and communication efforts during negotiation, as well as for their reactions to the other party's behavior. For example, the other party's competitive actions may be seen in a different light when individuals believe that their own conciliatory goals are obvious, as compared to when they appreciate that the other person might be uncertain about the nature of their objectives. People's beliefs about the intentions behind another person's actions can be critical to how they respond to the person, and thus to the results of negotiation (Thomas & Pondy, 1977).

In view of the potential significance of negotiators' beliefs about how they appear to the other parties involved in a dispute, it is surprising that these perceptions have gone largely unexamined by researchers. Empirical analyses of social perception in negotiation(1) have focused primarily on individuals' impressions of their fellow negotiators' motives and interests (e.g., Kelley & Stahelski, 1970; Thompson, 1995). Research that has considered self-as opposed to other-perception has identified a number of self-serving attribution biases that occur in the context of negotiation. For example, Brandstatter et al. (1982) found that negotiators attribute more responsibility for a deadlock to the other person than to themselves, and they give more credit to themselves for reaching an agreement than they give to the other person. Other investigations reveal that individuals tend to perceive their own motives as more cooperative than those of the other party. Thomas and Pondy (1977) found that executives dealing with a conflict of interest believed that they did more collaborating and compromising and less competing and avoiding, as compared to their interaction partners. However, the aforementioned research on self-perception in negotiation does not address whether individuals tend to presume that the other party will share their own personal interpretations of their actions, which is the central question in the present analysis.

Our main hypothesis that negotiators tend to overestimate the transparency of their goals and intentions is consistent with the findings of research conducted outside of the negotiation context. Newton (as cited in Griffin & Ross, 1991) examined communicators'
sensitivity to differences in the background information available to themselves as opposed to an audience. She assigned one group of participants ("tappers") the task of tapping out a melody for another group of participants ("listeners"). Tappers believed that listeners would easily be able to deduce the songs they were tapping, when in fact listeners almost never guessed correctly.

More recent research exploring the perceived transparency of self-relevant information provided a more direct basis for our hypothesis (Vorauer & Ross, 1998). Vorauer and Ross found that when self-knowledge was salient to individuals, they overestimated the extent to which their personality traits were transparent to an interaction partner. These results extend the research literature demonstrating that inferences about other people are guided by accessible constructs (see Higgins, 1989, for a review). For example, when the trait "adventurous" has been primed, individuals are more likely to see a person's ambiguous behavior as containing evidence of this trait (Higgins, Rholes, & Jones, 1977). It appears that a similar process occurs when individuals judge themselves, such that the greater the accessibility of self-relevant information, the greater its influence on individuals' interpretations of their own actions and remarks. Moreover, Vorauer and Ross's research suggests that when self-knowledge is salient, people do not distinguish very well between the personal information they detect in their behavior and the information available to an outside observer (see also Kenny & DePaulo, 1993).

The findings of Vorauer and Ross (1998) pertaining to personality traits led us to expect that individuals would overestimate the transparency of their goals in negotiation and that transparency overestimation would be exacerbated when the salience of negotiators' goals was increased. To the extent that the need to resolve disagreements with another person prompts individuals to consider their current priorities, interpersonal goals should generally be focal--and thus perceived as transparent--during negotiation. Anything that further heightens goal salience should heighten feelings of transparency. Reflecting intently on their goals before the interaction, for instance, should increase the extent to which people see their goals in their behavior and thus enhance transparency overestimation.

STUDY 1

In Study 1, we sought to generate an involving negotiation, in which people would be torn between their own opinions and their desire to take into account their interaction partner's position. We gave participants the task of agreeing on solutions to a series of interpersonal dilemmas, which were pretested to be relevant to students' personal values and to have no easy or obvious answers. Each negotiation took place between a negotiator-participant and a phantom second negotiator who did not actually exist. This "phantom" procedure allowed us to maintain experimental control by holding the behavior of the participants' fellow negotiator constant. Although the negotiation took place through the exchange of written responses to the problems, the expectation of an eventual problem-solving discussion (which never transpired) was induced to make the study more involving and to give the second negotiator greater psychological reality. An
observer-participant was also recruited for each session; this person had access to all of the information ostensibly exchanged between the two negotiators.

The dependent measures were perceived transparency and actual transparency. The measure of perceived transparency was designed to assess the subjective feeling of being readable: Negotiators estimated whether the outside observer would be able to discern their goals from their responses during the negotiation. Actual transparency was computed from the extent to which the outside observer did in fact form impressions consistent with the negotiator's goals.

We chose a set of five goals to use in our dependent measures. We were less concerned with capturing all of the goals that people might pursue than with including goals that would be likely to range in their importance to negotiators. Additionally, we sought to select objectives that were (intuitively) distinct. The first two goals were designed to capture assertiveness and accommodation; we developed a third goal that was based on seeking fairness (i.e., similar number of compromises by both parties). We expanded the list beyond these three possibilities by including one goal reflecting a focus on solving the problems and one goal reflecting a focus on the relationship (i.e., gaining the liking of the other person). Pretest data confirmed that the set of five goals contained some objectives that were likely to be quite important to negotiators and others that were likely to be unimportant; at the same time, there was considerable variability across individuals in the importance accorded to these five different goals. Note that our use of multiple objectives beyond the simple cooperative/competitive distinction is consistent with research and theory suggesting that there are many different goals that individuals may pursue in conflict situations (see, e.g., Knight & Dubro, 1984; Pruitt, 1983; Ruble & Thomas, 1976).

We manipulated goal salience by varying whether negotiators were asked to consider the set of goals for a few minutes prior to responding to the second negotiator. We expected that negotiators who thought about the goals ahead of time would feel more transparent than those who did not, as the former individuals would be particularly focused on their interpersonal motives during the interaction. For example, a negotiator who is led to focus on his goal of being assertive may view an instance where he decides to hold to his own position (rather than move in the other person's direction) as evidence of this goal, to a greater extent than he would have if he had instead been more focused on the issues raised by the dilemma. It was possible that the salience manipulation would affect negotiators' actual transparency as well as their perceived transparency: The more that negotiators reflected on their objectives, the more they might try to behave in a manner consistent with those objectives. We expected, however, that the effects of goal salience on self-perception would outpace its effects on behavior. It would seem easier for perceptions to change than for goals to be translated into concrete actions that could readily be decoded by an observer. Thus, we expected that increasing goal salience would serve to increase the discrepancy between perceived and actual transparency.

A final manipulation addressed the extent to which the effects of goal salience would depend on the nature of the information exchanged between negotiators. Imagine, for
example, two different bargaining situations. In one, communication consists solely of an exchange of offers and counteroffers. In the other, those offers are accompanied by explanations, appeals, and justifications. Conceivably, the salience of negotiators' private knowledge about their goals will have a greater influence on the quantity of personal information that they perceive in their behavior in the first scenario than in the second. Accessible self-knowledge may prompt negotiators to "go beyond the information given" (Bruner, 1957) in a constrained communication; that is, it can help them to attach significance to actions that would otherwise be ambiguous. The impact of accessible self-knowledge may be less clear in a relatively unconstrained communication, where perceived transparency might be high regardless of whether goals are particularly salient. Because there is less ambiguity surrounding such communications, there may be less opportunity for the salience of self-knowledge to be influential. We therefore predicted that increasing the accessibility of self-relevant information would serve to heighten perceived transparency in a highly constrained communication more so than in a less constrained communication. We expected a different pattern for actual transparency. It seemed unlikely that negotiators would successfully translate their salient goals into actions that could be decoded by an observer when their communication efforts were constrained, although conceivably they would do better under less restrictive conditions. A final prediction, then, was that transparency overestimation would be maximal when the negotiator's goals were salient and when the communication was constrained.

Method

PARTICIPANTS

One hundred and six introductory psychology students (46 men and 60 women) participated in the experiment to earn course credit. Two previously unacquainted individuals of the same sex were recruited for each session of the study. The 53 pairs were evenly distributed across the four cells created by the 2 (high vs. low salience) x 2 (high vs. low constraint) design; the ratio of male to female pairs in each cell was approximately the same.

PROCEDURE

Upon their arrival at the laboratory, the experimenter gave participants some examples of negotiation situations and explained that the researchers were interested in people's thoughts and perceptions about the negotiation process. Participants were told that the study involved negotiating solutions to a series of 10 personal dilemma problems. One pair member was randomly assigned to the role of negotiator; the other pair member was assigned to the observer role. Participants were then given an overview of the procedure.

Overview. The experimenter explained that there was a third person involved in the study, a second negotiator, with whom they would eventually meet. The negotiator would trade written responses to the problems back and forth with the second negotiator and ultimately meet the person (who was described as the same sex as the participant) for a problem-solving discussion. During the discussion, they would have to agree on solutions
to each of the problems. The observer would read all written material passed between the
negotiator and the second negotiator and would watch the problem-solving discussion.
Up until the discussion, all three would be placed in separate rooms. Participants would
be given questionnaires at different points in the study asking them about their thoughts
and perceptions regarding the negotiation. Both participants understood that the
observer's purpose was to provide an "outsider's perspective" on the negotiation. In
actuality, there was no third person and the discussion never took place.

Initial responses. Ten personal dilemmas were presented to the negotiator. The response
format for the dilemmas was multiple choice. For each problem, the negotiator was
instructed to choose the best solution from the four or five alternatives provided. Some of
the problems were based on previously developed dilemma situations (J. D. Campbell,
personal communication, 1989; Kohlberg, 1981), and others were inspired by dilemmas
from the game "Scruples." Many of the problems and most of the potential solutions were
constructed by the authors. The 10 problems were selected from a larger sample
administered in a pretest with 30 students. Each problem used in the present study
received an average rating greater than 2 on a 3-point scale where 1 = not at all and 3 =
extremely "relevant to values that are important to me." Additionally, we used the pretest
data to eliminate problems for which 65% or more students chose the same answer. The
full set of problems is provided in the appendix. The negotiator filled out two copies of
his or her responses. One copy was for the negotiator to keep, and the other was to pass
along to the observer and then ostensibly to the second negotiator.

Second negotiator's responses. After the negotiator had finished, he or she was presented
with the second negotiator's (ostensible) initial responses to the problems. The second
negotiator's responses were always the same; they were designed (with the aid of the
pretest data) so that on average they would disagree with the negotiator's answers for
about 62.5% of the problems. We wanted to ensure that all negotiators would encounter
at least some disagreement but also to avoid disagreement being so frequent that
negotiators questioned the reasonableness of their fellow negotiator.

Salience manipulation. The salience manipulation took place immediately after the
negotiator received the second negotiator's initial responses. Negotiators in the High
Salience condition received a list of five possible goals that a person might have during a
negotiation:

1. Hold firm to my own personal opinions

2. Make sure that the other person feels satisfied with the chosen solutions, even if it
   means that I have to compromise some of my own values and beliefs

3. Make sure that each of us makes a similar number of compromises

4. Focus on identifying the best solutions to the problems without worrying about the
   implications of my choices for my relationship with the other person
5. Gain the liking of the other person

They were asked to think about the goals for a few minutes; however, they were not to write anything down. Negotiators in the Low Salience condition did not consider the list of goals.

Second responses. The negotiator then made his or her second responses to the problems. In making his or her second responses, the negotiator was instructed:

> You should consider your initial answers in light of the other person's opinions and then answer again. You may or may not wish to change your initial answers: For now, you can do what you want. Just remember, though, that ultimately the two of you will have to reach an agreement on each problem. So, if there are any problems on which you are "torn," or don't have a strong preference for your first choice, you may want to move in the other person's direction.

Constraint manipulation. Negotiators in the High Constraint condition made their second responses in the same fashion as they made their initial responses: They circled the solution that they now considered to be the best. Negotiators in the Low Constraint condition were given more opportunity to communicate with the second negotiator. For each problem where they were still in disagreement with him or her, they were instructed:

> In addition to indicating your preferred solutions, you should explain your reasons for choosing the solutions that you did and indicate the process that you feel you and the other person will have to go through to ultimately reach a consensus.

A series of blank lines was provided for this purpose.

Throughout the procedure, the observer was kept apprised of the negotiation. The observer received the copy of the negotiator's initial responses to the problems as soon as it was available and was also given a copy of the second negotiator's initial responses to the problems. Thus, the observer had access to the same written information as the negotiator. Negotiators kept their second responses while they filled out the dependent measures, which were administered immediately after the second responses had been made. The negotiator's second responses were then passed on to the observers so that they could complete the dependent measures.

Dependent measures. Negotiators first indicated their actual goals. They were asked how important each of the five possible goals in the list was to them as they were responding to the personal dilemma problems. They rated each goal on a 3-point scale, where 1 = not at all important, 2 = moderately important, and 3 = extremely important. Next, they indicated which one of the five goals they felt was their single most important goal. Negotiators' beliefs about the transparency of their goals were then assessed. They were reminded that the observer had read their own and the second negotiator's initial responses to the problems and that the observer would read their second responses to the problems as well. Negotiators were also informed that the observer would be asked how important he or she thought each of the goals was to them and to indicate their most
important goal. Negotiators were asked to go through each of the five goals and indicate (yes or no) whether they believed that the observer would be able to accurately assess how important the goal was to them (i.e., whether the observer's estimate would match the goal's actual importance to them). Finally, negotiators indicated (yes or no) whether they thought that the observer would be able to tell which one of the five goals was their single most important goal. We opted for a yes/no "readability" measure instead of having negotiators make numerical estimates to guard against the possibility that they would use their self-perceptions as a "best guess," in the absence of really feeling that the observer would be able to discern how important the goal was to them or which goal was most important to them.

Observers indicated how important they believed each of the five possible goals was to the negotiator as he or she was responding to the personal dilemma problems. They made their ratings on the 3-point scale where 1 = not at all important, 2 = moderately important, and 3 = extremely important. Next, they indicated which one of the five goals they felt was the negotiator's single most important goal.

Results

Unless otherwise indicated, there were no effects for sex when it was included as a factor in any of the analyses reported below.

TRANSPARENCY: MOST IMPORTANT GOAL

To what extent did negotiators feel that their most important goal was readily apparent in their responses to the problems? Did they overestimate the observer's ability to identify their most important goal? To examine these questions, we computed both perceived and actual transparency scores for negotiators. Perceived transparency of the most important goal was scored either 1 or 0, depending on whether negotiators responded yes, the observer could discern their primary goal, or no, the observer could not. Actual transparency of the most important goal was computed according to whether the observer's estimate actually matched the negotiator's most important goal (matches were scored 1, and mismatches were scored 0). These data were analyzed in a 2 (high vs. low salience) x 2 (high vs. low constraint) x 2 (perceived vs. actual transparency) repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA). Pairs were the unit of analysis; the first two factors were between-pairs variables, and the last factor was a within-pairs variable. Results revealed a main transparency overestimation effect, whereby negotiators exaggerated the ease with which the observer would be able to discern their most important goal, perceived and actual transparency Ms = .60 and .26, respectively, F(1, 49) = 11.84, p = .001. Indeed, although observers' actual ability to detect negotiators' most important goal was no better than one would expect from purely random guessing (.20), t(52) = 1.05, ns, a clear majority of negotiators expected that the observer would be able to accurately identify their primary objective. Negotiators expected significantly better than chance accuracy from observers, t(52) = 5.95, p [is less than] .001. There were no other effects. Conceivably, transparency exaggeration occurred across all of the experimental conditions because negotiators' most important goal was highly salient to
them regardless of whether they were in the High or Low Salience condition. The robustness of transparency overestimation with respect to negotiators' most important goal suggests that it may be necessary to look to a more comprehensive transparency measure to detect the effects of the experimental manipulations.

TRANSPARENCY: SUMMATED MEASURE

A summated measure of negotiators' perceived transparency was calculated by summing across the five goals the number of times that they said yes, the observer would be able to accurately assess how important the goal was to them. Scores could thus range from 0 to 5. A summated measure of negotiator's actual transparency was computed by assessing whether the observer's ratings matched the actual importance ratings of the negotiator. Matches were summed across the five goals, such that the scores could range from 0 to 5.

To determine whether negotiators overestimated the number of their goals that the observer could judge accurately, and whether their propensity to exaggerate their transparency was affected by goal salience or constraints on communication, negotiators' perceived and actual transparency on the summated measure were examined with the same 2 x 2 x 2 repeated-measures ANOVA used for the measure regarding negotiators' most important goal. Consistent with our hypothesis and with the results obtained for the measure regarding negotiators' most important goal, negotiators generally overestimated an observer's ability to discern their goals from their behavior during negotiation. The analysis revealed a main effect for the perceived versus actual transparency factor, whereby negotiators felt that more of their goals were transparent to the observer than actually was the case, respective Ms = 3.09 and 2.11, F(1, 49) = 24.30, p [is less than] .001.

Our key hypothesis regarding the interactive effects of goal salience and behavioral constraint on transparency overestimation was also supported. Goal salience served to increase the discrepancy between perceived and actual transparency in constrained but not unconstrained communications. Consider the means in the High and Low Constraint conditions separately. In the High Constraint condition, negotiators overestimated their transparency when their goals were high in salience, perceived and actual Ms = 3.31 and 1.69, respectively, F(1, 49) = 16.47, p [is less than] .001, but not when their goals were low in salience, perceived and actual Ms = 2.39 and 2.69, respectively, F [is less than] 1. These effects reflect a Perceived/Actual Transparency x Salience interaction in the High Constraint condition, F(1, 49) = 11.67, p [is less than] .001. Another way to describe this interaction is to note that negotiators felt more transparent in the High Salience (M = 3.31) than in the Low Salience cell (M = 2.39), F(1, 91) = 3.90, p = .05(2). However, they were in fact less transparent to the observer in the High Salience (M = 1.69) than in the Low Salience cell (M = 2.69), F(1, 91) = 4.58, p [is less than] .05. In the Low Constraint condition, only the main transparency overestimation effect was significant, perceived transparency M = 3.33 and actual transparency M = 2.04, F(1, 49) = 21.83, p [is less than] .001. Thus, negotiators recognized the limited personal information conveyed by their responses only when communication was constrained and when their goals were relatively low in salience. The distinct effects in the High as opposed to the Low
Constraint condition reflect an overall three-way interaction between Perceived/Actual Transparency, Constraint, and Salience, F(1, 49) = 4.36, p [is less than] .05. The cell means are presented in Table 1. The only other significant effect yielded by the overall analysis was a Perceived/Actual Transparency x Salience interaction, F(1, 49) = 7.76, p [is less than] .01, which was qualified by the three-way interaction described above.

### TABLE 1: Study 1: Mean Number of Goals Judged as Transparent by Negotiators (Perceived Transparency) and Observers (Actual Transparency) in High Versus Low Goal Salience and High Versus Low Behavioral Constraint Conditions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goal Salience</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>High</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Perceived</td>
<td>Actual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behavioral constraint</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>3.15</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>2.39</td>
<td>2.69</td>
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NOTE: Possible scores range from 0 to 5

Subsequent analyses revealed that although observers were on average incorrect in the majority of their importance ratings (2.89 of the five estimates, or 58% of the time), their errors were generally not extreme in magnitude. Observers rarely identified an extremely important goal as not at all important or vice versa. Instead, they tended to form importance judgments that deviated by one scale point from the negotiator's own importance rating. Over the whole sample, there were 19 errors involving deviations of two scale points and 134 errors involving one scale point. Thus, only 14% of the errors were extreme.

DO NEGOTIATORS KNOW WHICH OF THEIR GOALS ARE TRANSPARENT?

The summated measure of perceived and actual transparency does not address whether the goals that negotiators judged as transparent were the same ones that were in fact transparent to the observer. Because the measure is based on totals across the five goals, it is possible for perceived and actual transparency scores to match, even if different goals contributed to each (e.g., perceived transparency on goals 1 and 4, and actual transparency on goals 2 and 3). To assess whether negotiators were more likely to feel transparent with respect to goals that actually were transparent to the observer, we computed within-pairs correlations between perceived and actual transparency across the five goals. The average correlation was not significant, r(78) = .11, ns. (3,4)

GOAL IMPORTANCE

Negotiators' ratings of how important each of the goals actually was to them indicated actual goal importance; observers' impressions of how important each of the goals was to the negotiator indicated perceived goal importance. We examined whether there were any differences between the actual and perceived importance of any of the five goals. As we obtained a number of sex effects with these data, we report the analyses including sex as
a factor. A series of 2 (actual vs. perceived [i.e., negotiator vs. observer]) x 2 (male vs. female) repeated-measures ANOVAs were conducted. Pairs were the unit of analysis; the first factor was a within-pairs variable, and the second factor was a between-pairs variable. There was a significant discrepancy between the actual and perceived importance of two of the goals. Negotiators indicated that Goal 1 was less important to them (M = 2.25) than observers thought it was (M = 2.45), F(1, 51) = 5.97, p < .025. Additionally, negotiators indicated that Goal 2 was more important to them (M = 2.11) than observers thought it was (M = 1.57), F(1, 51) = 22.07, p < .001. Men and women differed in the importance ratings they assigned to two of the goals. Women gave higher importance ratings than men to Goal 2, respective Ms = 1.98 and 1.65, F(1, 51) = 5.41, p < .025, and to Goal 3, respective Ms = 1.90 and 1.54, F(1, 51) = 7.92, p < .01; these effects were not qualified by the negotiator/observer factor. There were no other effects. The mean actual importance and perceived importance of each goal are presented in Table 2.

DISCERNING "ABSOLUTE" VERSUS "RELATIVE" GOAL IMPORTANCE

Results on the summated measure of transparency suggest that negotiators exaggerated the observer's ability to discern precisely--in absolute terms--how important the five goals were to them. An alternative conceptualization of transparency centers on observers' ability to identify the goals that are relatively important versus unimportant to the negotiator. The importance ratings presented in Table 2 indicate that at a mean level over the whole sample, observers' judgments conformed reasonably well to those provided by negotiators. Indeed, negotiators and observers "agreed" on the top-ranked (Goal 4), second-ranked (Goal 1), and lowest-ranked (Goal 5) goals. We examined the extent to which such agreement occurred between specific pair members by calculating within-pair correlations between negotiators' and observers' importance ratings across the five goals. The mean within-pair correlation was significant, r(104) = .41, p < .001.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goal Description</th>
<th>Actual Importance</th>
<th>Perceived Importance</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Hold firm to my own personal opinions.</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>2.45(*)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Make sure that the other person feels satisfied with the chosen solutions,</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>1.57(**)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>even if it means that I have to compromise some of my own values and beliefs.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Make sure that each of us makes a similar number of compromises.</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>1.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Focus on identifying the best solutions to the problems without worrying</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>2.55</td>
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<tr>
<td>about the implications of my choices for my relationship with the other</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>person.</td>
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</table>
5. Gain the liking of the other person.  

1.34  1.23

NOTE: Responses were made on a 3-point scale, where 1 = not at all important and 3 = extremely important.  
(*) p < .05  (**) p < .001.

We did not obtain the parallel judgments from negotiators that would provide a standard of comparison for observers' accuracy about relative goal importance. Thus, the extent to which observers' accuracy in this regard was less or greater than what negotiators would have expected is unclear. However, the results obtained with respect to negotiators' single most important goal, which was in essence a relative judgment, did suggest that negotiators may overestimate observers' accuracy about relative goal importance as well.(6) Judgments about relative goal importance would seem most relevant in situations where there is ongoing agreement across the parties involved in a negotiation about a limited set of possible goals that might be pursued.

Although observers appear to have been reasonably accurate about the relative importance of the various goals to the negotiator, their accuracy does not necessarily reflect sensitivity to the implications of the negotiator's behavior. Instead, it may reflect alternative processes, such as estimating the negotiator's goals from those that they themselves would pursue. To explore observers' sensitivity to the goals of the particular negotiator that they observed, we examined the correlation between negotiators' actual importance ratings and observers' perceived importance ratings for each goal over the whole sample. These analyses suggested that for most of the goals, observers' importance ratings were not clearly connected to the importance ratings of the negotiator. The only significant relation was for Goal 1, \( r(53) = .29, p < .05 \). When regression analyses were conducted with sex, actual importance, and the interaction term as predictors of perceived importance, the interaction term was significant for Goal 2, \( \text{Beta} = 1.09, T = 2.37, p < .025 \). Perceived and actual importance were significantly correlated for female pairs, \( r(30) = .43, p < .025 \), but not for male pairs, \( r(23) = -.19, \text{ns} \).

BEHAVIOR

To what extent did negotiators change their answers in response to the second negotiator's opinions? We computed the average number of initial and final disagreements negotiators had with the second negotiator and analyzed these data in a 2 (high vs. low salience) x 2 (high vs. low constraint) x 2 (initial vs. final disagreement) repeated-measures ANOVA; the first two factors were between-subjects variables, and the last factor was a within-subjects variable. Results indicated that negotiators initially disagreed with the second negotiator on an average of 6.23 of the 10 problems; in their second round of responses, they disagreed with the second negotiator on an average of 5.38 of the problems. This move toward less disagreement was significant, \( F(1, 49) = 21.13, p < .001 \). There were no other effects.

We examined the nature of the comments that participants in the Low Constraint condition made when explaining their reasons for choosing the solutions they did in the
second round of responses. Without exception, participants' answers were extremely problem focused (e.g., outlining their feelings about euthanasia or their personal philosophies about how to deal with friends and family). Despite the instructions, then, no one commented on the process needed for reaching consensus, nor did anyone elect to explicitly communicate their goals for the negotiation.

Discussion

The results of this experiment indicate that a negotiator is likely to perceive his or her goals to be more transparent than they actually are. Negotiators overestimated an outside observer's ability to discern their single most important goal, as well as the number of their goals that the observer could judge accurately. Indeed, although negotiators generally expected that the observer could identify which of the five goals was the most important to them, observers achieved little better than chance accuracy at this task. These findings suggest, for example, that an individual with the goal of ensuring others' satisfaction with the outcome of a negotiation might anticipate that this motive will be readily apparent to his or her fellow negotiators when in fact it is not. Although sufficient communication has not taken place, the individual is apt to assume that others will be able to discern whether particular objectives are of great or little importance to him or her.

Interestingly, when negotiators were prompted to contemplate their objectives before responding to the second negotiator, their assessment of their own transparency was more prone to bias than it was in the absence of any such preparation for the negotiation. On the summated measure, goal salience served to enhance negotiators' feelings of transparency but not their actual transparency to an observer. This finding suggests that when people enter a negotiation situation with salient goals regarding how they will deal with their interaction partner, they may be especially likely to exaggerate the extent to which their orientation is transparent. However, this effect occurred only with respect to constrained communications; when communication was relatively unrestricted, transparency overestimation occurred regardless of goal salience. Additionally, negotiators' perception of whether their single most important goal was discernible was unaffected by goal salience or constraints on communication. Conceivably, negotiators' primary goal was personally salient even when they were not prompted by the experimenter to focus on it. This possibility is consistent with research indicating that attitudes of high personal importance to individuals are more cognitively accessible than attitudes that are less important to them (Krosnick, 1989).

STUDY 2

A number of factors may contribute to the transparency overestimation effect demonstrated in Study 1. Our analysis has emphasized a cognitive process whereby private self-knowledge guides negotiators' interpretations of their own actions, leading them to see evidence of their goals in what they say and do. Outside observers, because they do not have access to the private knowledge, form impressions that are less consistent with it. Other possible sources of transparency overestimation are motivational in nature. Individuals may wish to believe that they are transparent. Conceivably,
perceiving that they have accurately communicated their goals contributes to people's sense of self-efficacy (Bandura, 1982). Feeling transparent might also be an end in itself. Research by Swann (1983) on the desire for self-verification suggests that individuals want other people to see them as they see themselves, regardless of whether that involves positive or negative impressions. A sense that one's goals are readily apparent to others would clearly be consistent with such a desire. It is also possible for self-enhancement motivation to be manifest as transparency overestimation. If individuals' self-perceptions are more positive than another person's impressions of them, a wish to believe that they have made a favorable impression may result in their assuming greater congruence between their self-perceptions and the person's impressions of them than actually exists.

In Study 2, we sought to demonstrate the role played by cognitive processes in producing transparency overestimation. We reasoned that we could test how negotiators' perceptions were affected by private self-knowledge—as opposed to self-verification or self-enhancement motivations—by comparing the inferences drawn by observers who were informed versus uninformed about the negotiators' goals. We compiled into a series of booklets the responses made by negotiators (and the second negotiator) in the Low Constraint-Low Salience condition of Study 1. We selected this particular condition because it seemed to best represent negotiators' and observers' "baseline" inferences. Each booklet, corresponding to one negotiator in Study 1, was given to two observers. The uninformed observers estimated the negotiator's goals. The informed observers were given the negotiator's goal importance ratings; they then estimated whether an outside observer would be able to tell how important each of the goals was to the negotiator. We expected that the informed observers would exaggerate an uninformed observer's ability to discern the negotiator's goals, just as the negotiators did themselves in the original study. Such an effect would suggest a role for private self-knowledge in generating transparency overestimation, as these informed observers should have no motivation to perceive the negotiator as transparent or to form particularly positive impressions of his or her goals. Note that in seeking evidence for this informational process, we do not deny that motivational forces may contribute to or enhance negotiators' propensity to exaggerate their transparency. However, we do seek to demonstrate that the phenomenon can occur in the absence of such motives.

Method

PARTICIPANTS

Twenty-six introductory psychology students at the University of Manitoba participated in the study to earn course credit. Each participant was yoked to one negotiator from Study 1. Thirteen of these participants (6 men and 7 women) were in the uninformed observer condition, and 13 (6 men and 7 women) were in the informed observer condition.

PROCEDURE
The study took place through a series of mass testing sessions. Participants received a booklet describing the events that had transpired between one negotiator and the second negotiator in Study 1. The sex of the observers was matched to the sex of pair members in the original study. One informed and one uninformed observer received a copy of each booklet. The booklet explained the procedure of Study 1 in detail. The problems were presented together with the negotiator's and second negotiator's initial responses, as well as the negotiator's second responses. Participants thus had access to all of the information available to observers in Study 1, except that they did not actually meet the negotiator, and his or her responses were typed rather than handwritten.

The 13 uninformed observers made their estimates after reading the description of the negotiation. They indicated how important they thought each of the five goals was to the negotiator, on the same 3-point scale used in Study 1. Additionally, they indicated which one of the five goals they felt was the negotiator's single most important goal. The 13 informed observers were presented with the negotiator's goal importance ratings before they completed the dependent measures. These observers indicated, for each of the five goals, whether an outside observer would be able to tell how important the goal was to the negotiator (i.e., whether the observer would correctly judge that the goal was not at all, moderately, or extremely important to the negotiator). For each one, they responded yes or no. Informed observers were also presented with the negotiator's most important goal. They indicated (yes or no) whether an outside observer would be able to tell that this particular goal was the negotiator's most important goal.

Results

OBERVERS JUDGMENTS

Uninformed observers did quite poorly at identifying the negotiator's single most important goal: They were rarely accurate in their judgments, M = .15. Informed observers estimated much greater transparency, however: They generally expected that an outside observer would correctly identify the negotiator's goal, M = .62, t(12) = 2.52, p [is less than] .05. Although uninformed observers fared slightly (but nonsignificantly) worse than they would through purely random guessing (.20), t [is less than] 1, informed observers expected them to achieve better than chance accuracy, t(12) = 2.96, p [is less than] .001. Our hypothesis that informed observers would evidence transparency overestimation was thus confirmed.

A similar effect was obtained with respect to the summated transparency measure. Although informed observers anticipated that an outside observer would correctly identify how important 3.00 of the 5 goals were to the negotiator, uninformed observers provided accurate estimates for only 1.62 of the 5 goals, t(12) = 3.98, p [is less than] .005. Observers who were privy to the negotiator's importance ratings apparently discerned sufficient evidence of the person's goals in his or her responses during the negotiation to surmise, inaccurately, that the goals would be apparent to outside observers. It is interesting to note that informed observers in this study made transparency estimates (M = 3.00) that closely corresponded to those made by the negotiators themselves in
Study 1 (M = 3.15), t < 1. Uninformed observers were nonsignificantly less accurate (M = 1.62) than the observers in Study 1 (M = 2.00), t(12) = 1.44, ns, perhaps because of the lack of physical cues available to them.

Discussion

The results of Study 2 suggest that the transparency overestimation effect demonstrated in Study 1 is at least partly a function of the different information possessed by negotiators and observers. When observers were given some of the private self-knowledge possessed by a negotiator, their transparency estimates closely mirrored those made by the negotiator himself or herself. Once observers were apprised of the negotiator's goals, they appeared to discern evidence consistent with these goals in his or her behavior and wrongfully assume that this evidence would be apparent to uninformed observers as well. This process might best be characterized as one of biased hypothesis-testing (Kunda, 1990; Snyder & Swann, 1978), whereby individuals who ask themselves whether there is evidence of particular goals in negotiation behavior are predisposed by their information search strategy to reach an affirmative answer. The findings of this study thus suggest that motivational processes are not necessary to transparency overestimation.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

The present research demonstrates that individuals feel like more of an "open book" with respect to their goals in negotiation than they actually are. Study 1 revealed a general transparency overestimation effect, whereby negotiators exaggerated an observer's ability to correctly identify their single most important goal, as well as the observer's ability to accurately discern how important five interpersonal goals were to them during negotiation. The high constraint condition of this study also provided evidence that when individuals are prompted to contemplate their goals prior to negotiation, their feelings of transparency are enhanced even when their actual transparency is not. The more personally salient their objectives, the more readily apparent negotiators assumed these objectives to be to an observer of their behavior. The results of Study 2 suggested that the phenomenon can occur in the absence of motivational forces. When observers were given information about how important the goals were to the negotiator, they made inferences that closely corresponded to those made by the negotiator himself or herself. These informed observers presumed that uninformed observers would be more successful at discerning the negotiator's goals from his or her behavior that was actually the case. It seems that once participants had access to the privileged information, it was difficult for them to extrapolate the perspective of someone who did not.

Our findings are consistent with substantial literature documenting how people's judgments can be "contaminated" by extraneous information (Wilson & Brekke, 1994). Particularly relevant are those studies that examine individuals' propensity to appreciate the privileged quality of information that is uniquely available to them. Research on text comprehension reveals that when readers are asked to predict how a character in a story will react to an event, their predictions are often influenced by outside information
supplied by the experimenter, even though the character is supposedly oblivious to the information (Keysar, 1994). Similarly, Keysar, Ginzel, and Bazerman (1995) found that when individuals made predictions about a negotiator's decision in a company acquisition scenario, information that they were explicitly told was unavailable to the negotiator nevertheless affected the decision that they predicted he or she would make. Research on the hindsight bias demonstrates that once people have access to information (e.g., the correct answer to a quiz question), they have difficulty appreciating how others might be unaware of the information (Fischhoff, 1975). Together with the research by Vorauer and Ross (1998) on the perceived transparency of personality traits, the present findings complement this literature by demonstrating contamination effects with respect to self-relevant information. In essence, our results suggest that people sometimes have difficulty appreciating the distinction between their private and public self.

We have characterized the process underlying transparency overestimation as one in which individuals fail to realize how their private self-knowledge colors their interpretations of their own actions. An additional possibility is that individuals simply fail to draw a clear distinction between what they know and what other people know (Kenny & DePaulo, 1993). Although this process may contribute to the effect, the fact that the constraint manipulation affected negotiators' perceptions of transparency suggests that individuals do make at least some reference to their behavior. This reference might involve biased interpretation of decisions and remarks, as we suggest. Alternatively, it could involve individuals' theories about the amount of information that is necessary for a judgment to be possible (Yzerbyt, Schadron, Leyens, & Rocher, 1994) or a process whereby individuals try to correct their personal perceptions of transparency to take into account the size of the behavior sample available to the observer but fail to make adjustments of sufficient magnitude (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).

Transparency overestimation would seem to have significant implications for the negotiation process. In particular, misperceptions about the transparency of one's motives may set the stage for frustration and hostility during bargaining. A belief that their accommodative or assertive goals are obvious to a fellow negotiator might lead individuals to react more negatively to any seemingly aggressive overtures the person makes, either because he or she is being selfish in the face of their own cooperative efforts or because the person is disregarding how personally important it is to them to prevail on the issue at hand. Alternatively, a person whose goal is to ensure an equal degree of compromise by all may unknowingly mislead others with a concession: Rather than perceiving it as a step toward ensuring fairness made in response to (or in anticipation of) similar gestures by others involved in the negotiation, the other negotiators may conclude that the person's interests were perhaps different than they had believed. In light of the importance of perceived intent to the negotiation process (Nord & Doherty, 1994; Thomas & Pondy, 1977), it may well be that the effects of transparency overestimation extend beyond individuals' affective reactions to their fellow negotiators to the quality of the agreements that are ultimately reached. However, although research suggests that individuals are prevented from maximizing their outcomes when their perceptions of their fellow negotiators are inaccurate (Thompson & Hastie, 1990) and when they fail to appreciate their privileged access to task-relevant information (Camerer,
Loewenstein, & Weber, 1989), further research is necessary to specify the consequences of transparency overestimation for the results of negotiations.

Conceivably, transparency overestimation would be reduced if individuals were alerted to the phenomenon. The effectiveness of forewarning is likely to depend on factors such as people's motivation to resist bias (Wilson & Brekke, 1994). In many cases, it may also be beneficial to increase actual transparency through enhancing communication. Research has consistently demonstrated low levels of information exchange between negotiators (Pruitt & Lewis, 1975; Thompson, 1991), even though such exchanges are profitable when they occur (Thompson, 1991). Along similar lines, research by Stasser, Taylor, and Hanna (1989) has revealed that individuals participating in group discussions are surprisingly reluctant to introduce or emphasize information about a problem that is uniquely available to them. Interestingly, transparency overestimation may itself hinder the communication process. There would seem to be numerous potential barriers to goal communication, such as the awkwardness of being explicit when one's goals are evaluative in nature (Blumberg, 1972), norms limiting the self-disclosure of personal information (Altman & Taylor, 1973), or insufficient emotional energy for articulating one's feelings (Nord & Doherty, 1994). However, individuals are unlikely even to consider making the effort if they feel that their goals are already discernible from their behavior: Research indicates that individuals' communication efforts are guided by their assumptions about what their interaction partner knows (Fussell & Krauss, 1992). The possibility that a negotiator's interaction partner will suspect ulterior motives or a hidden agenda behind explicit communications poses an additional possible barrier to understanding. Such suspicions are presumably less likely in high-trust relationships or in the early stages of a conflict of interest, before significant hostility has been generated. Indeed, the perceptions of informed observers in Study 2 suggest that at least under neutral conditions, individuals will be receptive to a negotiator's communications about his or her goals. In such cases, explicit articulation of one's goals should reduce transparency overestimation.

One potential limitation of the present research is that because we assessed perceived and actual transparency regarding only a limited number of predetermined goals, our list may not have included some of the negotiators' primary objectives. Even if this is the case, we believe that transparency overestimation with respect to moderately important (or entirely unimportant) goals is significant in its own right: Negotiators who exaggerate how readily apparent it is that they do not have a particular motive (e.g., manipulation or accommodation of the other party) may experience the same consequences as those who exaggerate the transparency of their key objectives. Nonetheless, a version of Study 1 in which negotiators are first given an opportunity to describe their idiosyncratic goals and then indicate the perceived transparency of those goals might produce results more representative of the judgments that people spontaneously make during everyday negotiations. We suspect that such a procedure would generate transparency overestimation effects of equal or greater magnitude than those obtained in Study 1. This speculation is based on our results suggesting that the more important a given goal is to a negotiator, the more likely he or she is to overestimate the transparency of that goal. Negotiators' goal importance ratings were positively related to their feelings of
transparency but not to their actual transparency to the observer. The dramatic transparency overestimation effect that occurred with respect to negotiators' single most important goal is also consistent with this possibility.

Note that observers' ability to discern the negotiator's single most important goal in Study 1 was probably enhanced by the inclusion of relatively unimportant goals in the list (indeed, we sought a range of goal importance in part to limit the difficulty of observers' task). If observers had instead tried to estimate the negotiator's most important goal in an open-ended fashion, or had chosen from a list of goals of generally higher importance to the negotiator, their accuracy might have been lower. It would be interesting to explore whether observers' accuracy would be higher if they generated the goal dimensions to be judged. In sum, deeper exploration of the types of goal judgments that are more or less likely to be associated with transparency overestimation remains an intriguing avenue for future research on this topic. Additionally, it would be fruitful to examine how well the effects that we obtained with respect to negotiation over differences of opinion generalize to negotiations involving competition for scarce resources, and whether emotions such as anxiety, anger, or guilt affect the likelihood of transparency overestimation. Interestingly, individuals may sometimes be particularly likely to exaggerate the transparency of goals that they are actively trying to hide, because of the high personal salience of such objectives.

The present research examined transparency overestimation in a context where the negotiator and the observer had no interaction history. Prior interactions with another person (e.g., a romantic partner) might enhance individuals' unrealistic expectation that he or She will be able to easily discern their intentions, particularly if individuals come to feel emotionally close to the person. That is, although actual transparency may increase as trust develops (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996; Rempel, Holmes, & Zanna, 1985), feelings of transparency may increase at an even faster pace because of the emotional bond. Note that such a pattern of increasing transparency overestimation would parallel and extend the effects obtained in Study 1 for low as opposed to high constraints on communication. However, when an interaction history has been predominantly negative, its implications might be quite different. Negotiators might feel less transparent to someone with whom they have had numerous conflict experiences: If negotiators' ingoing feelings, are hostile, they may have a lower expectancy that the person will see anything--including their own behavior--the same way that they do. Thus, our research perhaps best elucidates the potential for misunderstanding in circumstances that are generally amicable, such as interactions between spouses, friends, and family members, or in the early stages of a conflict of interest. Whether transparency overestimation also occurs in the context of more hostile relations is a question for future research. It may be the case that with respect to these types of relations, our findings speak most clearly to how the frustration, anger, and resentment are ignited in the first place.

NOTES

(1.) We use the term "negotiation" in a general way to refer to situations in which interdependent individuals have to deal with a conflict of interest. Our definition thus
includes social dilemma situations, even though social dilemmas are distinct from pure negotiation in numerous respects, perhaps most significantly in terms of the degree of communication that occurs between the parties involved (Thompson, 1990).

(2.) The degrees of freedom and error terms used to test simple effects in repeated-measures analyses of variance were computed according to the formulae provided by Howell (1987).

(3. 4.) The degrees of freedom for within-pairs and within-subjects correlations are sometimes reduced, as correlations cannot be calculated when there is a lack of variability in one of the measures. Here, correlations could not be computed for 14 of the pairs due to a lack of variability in either perceived or actual transparency. The degrees of freedom for all averaged correlations are calculated according to Mather's (1960) recommendations. We computed an alternative measure of transparency overestimation that focused specifically on the frequency of perceived/actual transparency "mismatches," that is, the number of traits where the negotiator felt transparent but in fact was not. We also computed a parallel measure of transparency underestimation, which reflected the number of traits where the negotiator did not feel transparent even though he or she actually was transparent. The means across the whole sample for these two types of errors were 1.66 and .68, respectively, t(52) = 4.50, p [is less than] .001. Pairs' scores on each of these measures were analyzed in a 2 (high vs. low salience) x 2 (high vs. low constraint) ANOVA. The pattern of results for transparency overestimation was directly parallel to that obtained for the summated transparency measure. The frequency of transparency overestimation was lower in the high constraint/low salience cell (M = .85) than it was in any of the three remaining cells, which did not differ significantly from each other (high constraint/high salience M = 2.15, low constraint/low salience M = 1.85, low constraint/high salience M = 1.79), Coal Salience x Constraint interaction F(1, 49) = 6.40, p [is less than] .025. There was also a main effect whereby transparency overestimation was more frequent in the high salience than the low salience condition, respective Ms = 1.96 and 1.35, F(1, 49) = 5.11, p [is less than] .05. With respect to the frequency of transparency underestimation, there was a main effect for goal salience whereby underestimation was less common in the high salience than the low salience condition, respective Ms = .44 and .92, F(1, 49) = 5.01, p [is less than] .05.

(5.) To explore the extent to which the negotiator/observer differences in perceived goal importance reflected a self-flattering pattern, we had 54 introductory psychology students read a complete description of the present negotiation context and rate the extent to which they perceived each of the five goals to be the "right" (i.e., most desirable) goal to have in such a negotiation. They made their ratings on a 7-point scale, where 1 = not at all right and 7 = extremely right. The average desirability ratings assigned to Goals 1 through 5 were, respectively, 4.43, 4.20, 4.00, 5.39, and 2.50. A series of t tests revealed that the first three goals did not differ significantly from each other in terms of how right they were perceived to be. Goal 4 was rated significantly higher than any of the four remaining goals, and Goal 5 was rated significantly lower than any of the other four goals. A series of t tests revealed that men rated Goal 1 as more desirable (M = 4.95) than did women (M = 4.09), t(52) = 2.06, p = .05, and that women viewed Goal 4 as more
desirable (M = 5.67) than did men (M = 4.95), t(52) = 2.06, p [is less than] .05. Overall, these data were not consistent with a self-enhancement interpretation of the negotiator/observer differences in perceived goal importance.

(6.) Negotiators were more likely to overestimate the transparency of their important goals than they were to overestimate the transparency of their unimportant goals: The average within-pair correlation between negotiators' goal importance ratings and perceived/actual transparency "mismatches" of overestimation was significant, r(86) = .25, p [is less than] .025. This pattern of results suggests that the transparency overestimation that was evident with respect to negotiators' most important goal might be less dramatic for goals of lesser importance to the negotiator. Further analyses that considered perceived and actual transparency separately indicated that perceived transparency was significantly related to negotiators' goal importance ratings, average within-subject r(82) = .30, p [is less than] .01, whereas actual transparency was not, average within-pair r(98) = -.11, ns.

(7.) We ran an additional informed observer condition to ensure that the results were not due to a response bias on the yes/no measures. It was identical in procedure to the one described, except participants made specific numerical estimates rather than yes/no judgments. That is, they used the 3-point scale to indicate an outside observer's likely impressions of the negotiator's goals, and they indicated which of the five goals an outside observer would think was most important to the negotiator. On both measures, these informed observers significantly overestimated the extent to which negotiators' goals would be transparent to the uninformed observers.

REFERENCES


APPENDIX

Interpersonal Dilemmas

1. You feel that your roommate is a genius when it comes to "chiseling" small amounts of money. For example, when you get on a bus, your roommate often doesn't have any
change, so you have to pay for both of you. When you go for coffee, you usually end up paying for both of you. Sometimes you wonder whether your roommate is having money problems but is too proud to admit it. Today, your roommate asked you to pick up a few small grocery items for him or her while you were doing your own shopping. So far, he or she hasn't paid you for what you bought.

a. From that point on, I would always claim not to have enough money on hand to pick up the tab for him or her.

b. I would keep quiet and keep paying--at least for the little things.

c. I would tell my roommate how I felt about the situation and request that we each pay our own expenses from that point on.

d. I would try to even things out by asking my roommate to pick up the tab for me once in a while.

e. I would figure out approximately how much my roommate owed me and ask him or her to pay me back.

2. Jan is a 28-year-old woman. Four years ago, she gave her daughter Samantha up for foster care because she was an alcoholic and could not care for the child. Jan has now been sober for 2 years, has a new job, and feels responsible enough to care for Samantha once again. Samantha is now 6 years old and has been living with the Jones's for all these years. The Jones's have been very caring people, and Samantha considers them her parents. The Jones's love Samantha as a daughter and would never want to give her up. The Jones's, however, have never legally adopted Samantha and therefore Jan decides to fight for custody of Samantha. You are the judge and must decide between the Jones's and Jan as to who should have the right to raise Samantha.

a. You grant sole custody of Samantha to the Jones's.

b. You grant sole custody of Samantha to Jan.

c. You grant Jan and the Jones's joint custody of Samantha.

d. You grant custody of Samantha to a third, neutral family, who is eager to adopt.

e. You ask Samantha what she wants.

3. Jeannette is a 45-year-old woman with very bad cancer. There is no treatment known to medicine that could save her. You, her doctor, know that she has only about 5 months to live. Jeannette is in terrible pain but is so weak that a good dose of a painkiller like morphine would make her die sooner. She is delirious and almost crazy with pain, but in her calm periods she asks you to give her enough morphine to kill her. She says she can't
stand the pain and is going to die in a few months anyway. You know that mercy killing is against the law and that you could be arrested for it.

a. You decide that you will not give Jeannette the overdose.

b. You decide to wait 1 week. If she still asks for the overdose at that time, you will give it to her.

c. You decide to give Jeannette a large dose of morphine that would kill her immediately.

d. You decide to consult with her family: If they agree, you will give Jeannette the morphine overdose.

e. You decide to leave a bottle of pills on her night table and let her know that ingesting the contents would kill her. After that, you would leave it up to her.

4. You are an adoption worker. A native child has been living happily with a White family for 3 years. Now his relatives want to take him back to the reserve.

a. You let the child stay with the White family.

b. You return the child to his biological parents.

c. You grant joint custody to both sets of parents.

d. You return the child to his biological parents for a 1-month trial period. At the end of I month, you will interview all three parties to see how they feel about the new arrangement.

5. Your sister is engaged to marry a man who, in your opinion, is "bad news." You do not trust him, and you suspect that he has been cheating on your sister. Your sister, however, is very much in love.

a. You voice your concerns clearly and strongly to your sister, telling her that she should not marry this man.

b. You take a gentler approach: You tell her about the man's behaviors that trouble you and ask her if she has noticed any such behaviors, and how she reacts to them.

c. You respect your sister's choice, and you do not say anything.

d. You don't say anything to your sister, but you confront her fiance and tell him that you suspect what he has been up to and that if he ever does anything like it again, you will tell your sister.
e. You decide to seek more information: You talk to his friends and previous girlfriends to find out whether your concerns are warranted.

6. Your close friend is near death from AIDS. There is one recently discovered drug that the doctors think could save your friend. The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist is charging 10 times what the drug cost him to make. He paid $1,000 to make the drug but is charging $10,000 for a small dose of the drug. You have asked to borrow money from everyone you know but have only been able to collect $5,000. You have told the druggist that your friend is dying, and you have asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said "No, I discovered the drug, and I'm going to make money from it."

a. You accept the druggist's decision.

b. You steal the drug.

c. You steal the drug, leaving the druggist the $5,000 you did collect as payment.

d. You steal the drug, leaving the $1,000 you know the drug is worth.

e. You decide to take the druggist to court to get the drug, even though the process may take months.

7. You are studying for a midterm one evening in the dormitory lounge. Jeff, someone you like but are not particularly close to, comes by. He is visibly upset. He tells you that he's having some problems with his girlfriend and that he's afraid that the relationship may be breaking apart. You happen to know that Jeff's girlfriend has been seeing someone else.

a. I would tell him (as gently as I could) that his girlfriend has been seeing someone else.

b. I would talk with him only briefly. Later, I would tell his girlfriend that she should end one of the relationships.

c. I would tell him that I am studying and I do not have time to talk.

d. I would listen and be sympathetic, without trying to give him advice.

e. I would point out some negative things about his girlfriend, hoping to encourage him to end the relationship himself.

8. For about the last 6 months your 17-year-old cousin Renata has been having a lot of problems. She has been skipping school, drinking heavily, and hanging out with the wrong crowd. Her parents have been worrying about her a lot lately and do not understand what caused Renata's sudden change in behavior. They are very concerned about Renata's safety. You and Renata have always been very close, and one day Renata
comes to you and tearfully confides that about 6 months ago she was raped at a party by a boy she just met. Renata makes you promise to keep her secret confidential and to not tell anyone, not even her parents. One day Renata's parents ask you if you know what could be troubling Renata.

a. You lie and say that you do not know, because you do not want to destroy the trust that Renata has put in you.

b. You decide to tell Renata's parents what happened to Renata and encourage them to talk to her about it themselves.

c. You do not tell them directly what happened, but you hint to them that there is something that Renata is not telling them.

d. You tell Renata's parents about what happened, but ask for assurance from them that they will not tell Renata that they know she was raped.

9. Your best friend Kim used to be very slim but has recently put on a lot of weight. She, however, does not want to admit to this fact and continues to wear the same size of clothes that she used to wear when she was thin. Kim's clothes are far too small for her and fit her extremely tightly. The rest of your classmates have noticed this too, and behind Kim's back they all laugh about how ridiculous she looks. One day, Kim asks you to tell her honestly what people think about her looks.

a. You decide to be honest and tell her what people have been saying about her.

b. You lie and tell her that everyone thinks she looks good, because you don't want to hurt her feelings.

c. You tell her honestly that people think maybe it is time for her to change her look, but you sugar-coat exactly what they have been saying about her.

d. You tell her that no one has said anything to you about how she looks.

10. You and your brother are still living at home with your parents. Lately, your mother has been remarking that she seems to be losing track of how she spends her money. Distraught, your mother is convinced that she must be losing her memory. One day, you come home unexpectedly from school and find your brother taking money from your mother's wallet. He claims that he cannot tell you why he is taking the money but assures you that it is for a good reason. He pleads with you not to tell your mother the truth.

a. You agree not to say anything.

b. You immediately tell your mother the truth.
c. You tell him that you are going to tell your mother. You give him a 1-day warning, so that he can tell her first if he chooses.

d. You do not say anything but instead lend your brother the money he obviously seems to need.

e. You tell him that you won't tell your mother. Later, though, you tell your mother that you are concerned about the way that your brother has been behaving and suggest that she have a talk with him to find out if anything is wrong.

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